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In recent years, debates about animal
consciousness have moved on from
the question of whether any non-
human animals are conscious to the
questions of which animals are con-
scious and what form their conscious
experiences take.
There is an emerging consensus that
current evidence supports attributing
some form of consciousness to other
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How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals
‘more conscious’ than others? This article presents a multidimensional frame-
work for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The
framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness,
evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and self-
consciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are
reviewed and future experiments are suggested. By assessing a given species
against each dimension,we can construct a consciousness profile for that species.
On this framework, there is no single scale along which species can be ranked as
more or less conscious. Rather, each species has its own distinctive conscious-
ness profile.cephalopod molluscs (octopuses, squid,
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If we try to make sense of variation
across the animal kingdomusing a single
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others, we will inevitably neglect impor-
tant dimensions of variation.
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framework that allows the conscious
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consciousness profile.
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A conscious being has subjective experiences of the world and its own body. Humans are
conscious beings, but are we alone? In 2012, the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
crystallised a scientific consensus that humans are not the only conscious beings and that
‘non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including
octopuses’ possess neurological substrates complex enough to support conscious experiences.
This consensus has allowed debates about animal consciousness to move on from the old
question of whether any non-human animals are conscious to the questions of which animals
are conscious and what form their conscious experiences take.
In the past 5 years, an interdisciplinary community of animal consciousness researchers, drawn
from neuroscience, evolutionary biology, comparative psychology, animal welfare science, and
philosophy, has begun to coalesce around these questions, as shown, for example, by the
founding of the journal Animal Sentience in 2016 [1]. The aim of this field is to study the inner
lives of animals (their subjective experiences and feelings) in a scientifically rigorous way, on the
model of the scientific study of human consciousness.
The field faces significant methodological challenges because non-human subjects cannot ver-
bally report their experiences [2]. But if you think the absence of verbal report precludes any sci-
entific investigation of animal consciousness, you should be prepared to say the same about
consciousness in preverbal infants and patients in aminimally conscious state. Animal conscious-
ness research rests on the idea that, by synthesising the insights and methods of multiple disci-
plines, and by identifying a battery of behavioural, cognitive, and neuronal criteria for attributing
conscious states, these challenges may be overcome.
Are Some Animals ‘More Conscious’ Than Others?
At present, the field is young and beset by foundational controversy: controversy about the
criteria for consciousness and the methods for studying those criteria [3–7]. At the heart of
these debates lies a conceptual question: How can we make sense of variation in consciousness
across the animal kingdom? Does it make sense to say that some animals are ‘more conscious’
than others? Does consciousness come in degrees? If it does, how can ‘degrees ofTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.007 1
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Trends in Cognitive Sciencesconsciousness’ be measured and investigated? For example, could a bird be more conscious
than a fish? Could an octopus be more conscious than a bee?
In studies of disorders of consciousness in humans, the idea of ‘levels of consciousness’ has
been influential [8]. Clinicians assessing patients with disorders of consciousness assign a level
of consciousness, with coma at one end of the scale, conscious wakefulness at the other, and
various intermediate grades (such as deep sleep and light sleep) in between. It is tempting to
apply this to non-human animals. We could attempt to construct a single sliding scale of animal
consciousness, along which birds (such as corvids), fish, cephalopods (such as octopuses),
bees, and so on could all be placed.
This, however, would be a mistake. Recently, the value of the ‘levels of consciousness’ frame-
work for conceptualising disorders of consciousness in humans has been called into question
[9–13]. The main concern is that, if we try to force states of consciousness into a one- or two-
dimensional scale, we will inevitably neglect important dimensions of variation. Critics of the
‘levels’ framework argue that we should instead adopt a multidimensional framework, capturing
several different dimensions of variation.
This point carries over to the case of animal consciousness, where the variation is likely to be
even more substantial and multifaceted. If the overall conscious states of humans with disorders
of consciousness vary along multiple dimensions, we should also expect the typical, healthy
conscious states of animals of different species to vary along many dimensions. If we ask ‘Is a
human more conscious than an octopus?’, the question barely makes sense. Any single scale
for evaluating questions such as these would end up neglecting important dimensions of
variation. For this reason, we suggest that animal consciousness research should adopt a
multidimensional approach, not a single-scale approach, when thinking about variation across
the animal kingdom.
What are the main dimensions of variation we can investigate? What do we currently know about
those dimensions? What future work would help us learn more about them? Our aim here is to
propose a multidimensional framework for thinking about animal consciousness. We will highlight
five significant dimensions of variation: perceptual richness (p-richness), evaluative richness
(e-richness), integration at a time (unity) and across time (temporality), and self-consciousness
(selfhood). For each dimension, wewill briefly review existing evidence that bears on that dimension
and we will propose future work that could help us rank a given species along that dimension
(Figure 1, Key Figure). We will then consider some of the challenges for a multidimensional
framework. We turn now to our five dimensions.
P-Richness
Our first dimension of variation is p-richness (the 'p' stands for 'perceptual'). Animals vary in the
level of detail with which they consciously perceive aspects of their environment. Animals that
make fine-grained conscious discriminations in a particular sense modality (e.g., vision) can be
said to have p-rich experiences in that modality. Any measure of p-richness is specific to a
sense modality, so we should not refer to a species’ overall level of p-richness. A species might
have richer perceptual experiences than another in one modality, but less rich experiences in a
different modality. For example, given their sensory abilities, elephants are likely to have much
richer olfactory experiences than humans but less richly detailed visual experiences [14–16].
Within a given sense modality, it is possible to resolve p-richness into different components. For
example, the richness of visual experience depends on bandwidth (the amount of visual content2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
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Figure 1. These hypothetical profiles highlight six important dimensions of variation, with p-richness represented separately
for vision and touch. These are not finished, evidence-based profiles: they are conjectures based on current evidence. A key
goal for animal consciousness research should be to produce a much richer evidence base for the construction of
consciousness profiles and more precise ways of measuring the dimensions. Abbreviations: p-richness, perceptual
richness; e-richness, evaluative richness.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesexperienced at any given time), acuity (the number of just-noticeable differences to which the
animal is sensitive), and categorisation power (the animal’s capacity to sort perceptual properties
into high-level categories). Does this make it impossible to develop overall evaluations of
p-richness for conscious vision? Not necessarily. If one species outperforms another with respect
to all three components, it has richer visual experiences overall. However, if the different compo-
nents of p-richness are poorly correlated (e.g., because some species have low bandwidth and
high acuity, or vice versa), we may decide that cross-species comparisons should use these
finer-grained dimensions rather than p-richness. That is an issue for further investigation.
To probe questions of p-richness rigorously, we need a way of disentangling conscious and
unconscious perception. Blindsight illustrates the difference: subjects report blindness in part of
their visual field, but they are able to use visual information about objects in that region to guide
action [17–19]. The standard interpretation of blindsight is that the subject has no conscious expe-
rience of what they perceive in the blind region. In the absence of verbal report, what provides
evidence that a particular stimulus is perceived consciously rather than unconsciously?
In broad terms, there is a neurological route and a cognitive route to evidence of conscious
perception. The neurological route involves experimentally induced blindsight. Monkeys with
lesions of the primary visual cortex, V1, have been shown to respond like humans with blindsight.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 3
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region of their visual field, but they can still use information about that stimulus to guide action in
forced-choice tasks [19]. This leads to the following thought: if a stimulus is processed in a brain re-
gion such that damage to that region results in blindsight, then a healthy, blindsight-free animal of the
species in question probably perceives that stimulus consciously. In principle, this strategy could be
extended to non-mammals, based on identifying homologues or analogues of V1 in those animals.
While blindsight solely concerns vision, there is some evidence for parallel phenomena in hearing
and olfaction [20,21]. The drawback to this neurological route is that it is invasive and difficult.
The cognitive route involves looking for cognitive tasks that are linked to conscious perception in
humans and then testing how well the target species of animal performs those tasks when the
stimuli are presented in a particular modality. Various forms of learning have been linked to
conscious perception [22,23]. One important example is trace conditioning, a version of classical
conditioning in which the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli are separated in time. For
instance, a tone may be followed, a second later, by a blast of air in your eye. There is evidence
that humans learn the association between the tone and the blast only if they consciously expe-
rience the stimuli and the temporal relation between them [24,25]. This points to a possible link
between conscious perception and the learning of temporal relations. If we find that an animal
is able to do trace conditioning on some stimulus, then that is some evidence, albeit not conclu-
sive evidence, that it consciously perceives that stimulus [26,27]. This cognitive route is likely to be
easier and cheaper to apply to a wide range of animals. Whichever route we take, one crucial
challenge is to design tests that push an animal’s conscious perception to the limit, inducing
maximally p-rich experiences. To achieve this, the stimuli need to be carefully tailored to the
animal’s sensory abilities and ecology.
E-Richness
The second dimension of variation is e-richness (the 'e' stands for 'evaluative'). Some conscious
emotions, such as pain, fear, grief, and anxiety, feel bad. These are affective experiences with neg-
ative valence. Others, such as pleasure, joy, comfort, and love, feel good. These are affective expe-
riences with positive valence. All affective responses have positive or negative valence. Valence
provides ‘an evaluative “common currency” for use in affectively-based decision making’ [28]. An-
imals are likely to vary in the richness of their experiences of valence. We think valence is likely to
prove a particularly useful concept for understanding variation because, while it may be dubious
to attribute specific human emotions (such as anxiety and grief) to a wide range of animals, valence
must be present wherever there is affect-based decision making. Some human emotions, such as
thirst, hunger, and pain, are plausibly shared by a wide range of animals [29], but we do not want to
take this for granted.
Finding out how positive and negative valence are produced in an animal, and how these processes
vary across taxa, should be a central goal of animal consciousness research. Assuming that all
conscious animals have an evaluation system of one sort or another, there remains room for grades
of sophistication. Some animals may be constantly evaluating small changes in their internal states
and external surroundings, as we do, whereas others may respond only to more substantial
changes. Like p-richness, e-richness has more than one component. Rich affect-based decision
making takes many inputs into account at once (evaluative bandwidth) and is sensitive to small
differences in those inputs (evaluative acuity). If these components turn out to be poorly correlated,
we may decide that cross-species comparisons need to use finer-grained dimensions.
Experiments probing motivational trade-offs can provide insight into how evaluation systems
vary. In one such experiment, rats (Rattus norvegicus domestica) were presented with an4 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
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sugar content of the solution against the temperature of the chamber: all else being equal, they
were willing to withstand colder temperatures to get sweeter rewards. This is evidence of an eval-
uative common currency: the value of sugar is weighed subtly against the disvalue of cold. Is it
also evidence of conscious experience of the currency? It is relevant that the trade-off is
crossmodal: this is not an animal evaluating options using information from a single sense, but
an animal weighing the taste of a liquid against the temperature of the ambient environment.
This requires the crossmodal integration of information, which has often been linked to con-
sciousness, although it may not strictly require it [31,32].
Similar experiments have been done on iguanas (Iguana iguana) [33] and hermit crabs (Pagurus
bernhardus) [34,35], with similar results. What is lacking, so far, is interspecies comparisons of the
sophistication of the evaluations being made by different species and investigations of how
sophisticated the evaluations need to be to indicate conscious affect. The motivational trade-
off paradigm has great potential and should be a priority for future work.
Integration at a Time (Unity)
Conscious experience in healthy adult humans is highly unified. You have a single perspective on
the world and everything of which you are consciously aware is part of that perspective. All the
experiences generated by your brain have a common subject. There are not two or more subjects
housed within the same skull.
Psychologists have long been fascinated by pathologies, such as the split-brain syndrome, in
which this unity apparently breaks down [36,37]. Subjects who have had the corpus callosum
wholly or partially severed sometimes display disunified behaviour when different stimuli are pre-
sented to the two halves of the visual field. If these subjects are asked to verbally describe what
they see, they will report what is visible on the right-hand side of their visual field. This is because
language is predominantly controlled by the brain’s left hemisphere, which only has access to
visual information from the right-hand side. Yet, when asked to draw with the left hand what
they see, they will draw what is visible on the left-hand side of the visual field. This is because
the left hand is predominantly controlled by the right hemisphere, which only has access to visual
information from the left-hand side. This disunity of behaviour leads to a debate about whether
experience itself is also disunified. Could there be two subjects within one skull? [36–39].
The same questions can be asked of non-human animals. Birds are particularly interesting in this
respect because they are natural split-brains. They have no structure akin to the corpus callosum
connecting the two hemispheres of the dorsal pallium, which is homologous to the cortex in
mammals [40]. Could every bird be a pair of conscious subjects, intimately cooperating with
each other? A similar debate arises with respect to the cerebral ganglia and brachial plexus
(a nerve ring around the top of the arms) of the octopus [23,41–43]. These structures are
connected, but they have some degree of functional autonomy from each other. Could an
octopus have two, or even nine, conscious perspectives on the world? Current evidence does
not settle these questions; our aim is only to raise them.
What provides evidence that an animal has a single, unified perspective as opposed to multiple
perspectives? It is crucial to investigate cognition as well as neuroanatomy. Here we can draw
inspiration from experiments on split-brain humans. One paradigm involves training an animal
to perform a task in response to a stimulus presented to one eye and seeing whether the task
can still be performed when the stimulus is presented to the other eye: interocular transfer. In
pigeons (Columbia livia), the visual field for each eye can be divided into two regions: the redTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 5
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covers the upper frontal and lateral regions. There can be interocular transfer between the red
fields of each eye, but there seems to be no interocular transfer between the yellow fields in nearly
all individuals [44]. Some particular individuals can do it, but no one knows why [44].
There is a need for more experiments that investigate the integration of the two visual hemifields
and the related question of whether information presented to one hemisphere is accessible for
the guidance of actions controlled by the other. For cephalopods, there is a further question
about the extent to which information presented to the arms is accessible to the brain, or vice
versa. The existing evidence in corvids and cephalopods presents a complicated picture, with
some studies pointing towards surprising dissociations and others indicating substantial integra-
tion (Boxes 1 and 2).
Clues regarding the unity of consciousness may also come from unihemispheric sleep. If one
hemisphere sleeps while the other is awake, that is suggestive of more than one stream of
consciousness, though not conclusive. This has been observed not only in various birds, but
also in dolphins and seals [45].
Integration across Time (Temporality)
Normal human experience is highly integrated across time. Our experience of the world takes the
form of a continuous stream, one moment flowing into the next [46,47]. For example, we experi-
ence the leaves of a tree blowing in the wind; we do not infer the motion from a series of static
snapshots. Human experience is also temporally integrated across longer timescales. We are
able to recall past experiences and simulate future experiences, a form of ‘mental time travel’
[48]. Let us call this dimension temporality.
What could constitute evidence for a temporally integrated stream, rather than a staccato series
of fragmented experiences? One possibility is to look for mechanisms that edit sensory input to
produce a coherent, continuous stream from discontinuous stimuli. In humans, evidence for
such mechanisms comes from the colour-phi illusion, in which two spatially separated, differently
coloured dots flashed in sequence are perceived as a single moving dot that changes colour half-
way across the gap [49]. The brain is not simply mistaking two static stimuli for a moving stimulus:
it is constructing a coherent account of how the stimulus is changing. Colour-phi has received a
great deal of discussion in the philosophy of consciousness [50]. Whatmatters here is simply that,
if we found colour-phi in non-human animals, this would be evidence that they too have mecha-
nisms that transform a series of discrete stimuli into a coherent experience of change. Although
our evidence of colour-phi in humans comes from verbal report, it is possible in principle to
study colour-phi in the absence of verbal criteria [51]. Animals could be trained to respond differ-
ently to perceptions of continuous and discrete stimuli and to stimuli that change colour half-way
and stimuli that do not. We could then present them with a colour-phi test stimulus, gradually
reducing the interstimulus interval. Would there be a threshold at which the animal switched
from categorising the stimulus as discrete to categorising it as continuous and would the animal
categorise the stimulus as one that changes colour half-way?
Turning to integration over longer timescales, what provides evidence for conscious mental time
travel? This higher grade of temporality probably requires substantial cognitive sophistication.
The most promising places to look for it are great apes, cetaceans, corvids (Box 1), and cepha-
lopods (Box 2). The evidence for mental time travel in corvids is particularly strong. Corvids are
able to produce rich and flexible representations of past events and prepare for specific future
scenarios [52]. For example, California scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) plan ahead when6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Box 1. Current Evidence and Open Questions: Corvids
P-richness: corvids possess rich colour and UV vision [77,78] with superb motion sensitivity [79]. Their vision supports
sophisticated cognitive behaviours. For example, New Caledonian crows possess binocular overlap that supports tool
manufacture and tool-use [80]. Other corvid species rely on vision to recognise specific individuals [81] and to observe
where other birds have hidden food caches [82]. Their keen auditory abilities allow for communication through a rich array
of calls and songs [83].
E-richness: various corvid species exhibit play behaviour, which is often linked to positive emotions. For example, corvids
have been observed repeatedly sliding down steep snow-covered inclines on a plastic lid [84]. Behaviours suggestive of
negative emotions have also been reported. When exposed to models of dead conspecifics, crows recruit neighbours
to the scene [85]. Ravens (Figure IA) show a pessimism bias after being exposed to a conspecific in a negative state,
resembling emotional contagion [86]. Future research should focus on whether such behaviours involve experiences of
anxiety, fear, stress, or grief.
Unity: corvids process information bilaterally: one brain hemisphere exerts dominant control over specific functions. During
spatial memory tasks, the right eye system shows a preference for object-specific cues and the left eye system for spatial
cues [87]. New Caledonian crows prefer a specific foot during tool manufacturing/use [88]. There is also evidence of
lateralised emotional processing [89]. The implications of lateralization for the unity of consciousness require further
investigation.
Temporality: corvids remember the ‘what, where, and when’ of past events (episodic-like memory) and anticipate future
scenarios. California scrub-jays discriminately retrieve items based on what they remember they had cached, where they
cached it, and when [90]. They show flexibility in the temporal patterns they can learn: they can learn that food is inedible
after a short interval but will ‘ripen’ after a long interval [91]. Caching decisions are based on future planning. After
experiencing that one room never contained breakfast and one room always offered breakfast, jays spontaneously cached
in the room that did not offer breakfast [53].
Selfhood: magpies have passed the mirror-mark test [69]. There is also evidence that corvids recognise that they have
different perspectives/desires from others. For example, jays use information from their own experience as a pilferer to
make inferences about opportunities for theft by others [74]. Male Eurasian jays (Figure IB) feed their female partner the
food she would like to eat, adapting to her changing desires [92]. Further research is required to explore the link between
these abilities and self-consciousness.
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Figure I. Two Corvid Species Commonly Used in Comparative Cognition Research. (A) Ravens © User: Colin/
Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 4.0; (B) Eurasian jay © Mrs Airwolfhound/Flickr/CC BY-ND 2.0.
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plan ahead when offered tools or tokens that they will need later for a task that they would never
have encountered in the wild [54]. There is evidence that some corvids can plan spontaneously,
and such future-oriented behaviours cannot be solely explained through reinforcement learningTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 7
Box 2. Current Evidence and Open Questions: Cephalopods
P-richness: cephalopods possess rich visual and chemo-tactile perception. Although colour-blind [93,94], they are
sensitive to polarised light [95] and can discriminate between patterns of different contrast [96], size, and shape [97]. They
dynamically adjust their body patterns to a wide range of backgrounds, requiring a visual system that can process complex
scenes [98]. Cephalopods possess chemoreceptors on their suckers [99,100], which are thought to facilitate a taste-by-
touch ability [101].
E-richness: play, a behaviour linked to positive emotion, has frequently been reported in octopuses (Figure IA) [102,103].
For example, they have been observed manipulating plastic bottles with jets of water, repeating the behaviour when the
current brings the bottles back [104]. What about pain? Octopuses and squid possess sensory neurons that encode
noxious stimuli [105–107]. Further research is required to assess whether they experience a conscious, pain-like state,
but there is a serious risk that they do.
Unity: cephalopods process information bilaterally: specific cognitive functions are processed by either the left or right side
of the brain [108,109]. For example, cuttlefish (Figure IB) predominantly use their right eye and associated neural structures
to adjust the brightness of their camouflage [110]. However, a recent study showed that cuttlefish rely on stereopsis (depth
perception, achieved by integrating information from both eyes) when hunting [111], suggesting that visual information
from the two eyes is sometimes integrated. Octopuses prefer different arms for different activities and their arms appear
to function partly independently of the brain. Each arm has a self-recognition mechanism that prevents interference with
other arms [112]. The question of whether cephalopods possess multiple conscious perspectives remains open.
Temporality: cuttlefish integrate experiences across time to guide behaviour. They remember the ‘what, where, and when’
of past events (episodic-like memory). They search for prey depending on what they had previously eaten, where they had
sourced their previous meal, and how much time had elapsed since that meal [113]. They adjust foraging behaviour by
whether, on a previous occasion, they had seen or smelled the prey [57]. They can also use near-future expectations to
modify behaviour: if they expect shrimp to be available later, they will eat less crab now [114].
Selfhood: there is no compelling evidence of cephalopods possessing self-recognition [115], but the question calls for
systematic exploration. Their sophisticated abilities to camouflage, disguise themselves as inanimate objects [116], and
mimic unappetising/venomous animals [117] (or even algae, as in Figure IA), suggest some grasp of how their body
appears to others.
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Figure I. Two Cephalopod Groups That Are Suitable Candidates for Investigating Consciousness.
(A) Octopus © dynamofoto, used under license; (B) cuttlefish © Alexandra Schnell.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences[53]. Although these results have been criticised [55,56], we regard spontaneous planning as a
promising nonverbal indicator of conscious temporal integration.
There is a need for more evidence that planning and remembering in animals involves conscious
simulation. What form could this evidence take? If an animal can remember the source of a
memory (e.g., vision or smell) and not just the content, that is suggestive of conscious recall,
though not conclusive [57]. In humans, a simulated episode (for example, walking across a
room) unfolds over the same length of time as a perceptual experience of the same episode8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Trends in Cognitive Sciences[58,59]. If we found evidence that the mental rehearsal of future actions unfolds over the same
length of time as the actions themselves, this would be evidence of something strikingly close
to human mental time travel.
Self-Consciousness (Selfhood)
Self-consciousness, or selfhood, is the conscious awareness of oneself as distinct from the world
outside. Like all the other dimensions, this is a capacity that admits of gradations [60,61]. A min-
imal level of self-consciousnessmay be present in a wide range of animals. It involves registering a
difference between self and other: registering some experiences as representing internal bodily
events and other experiences as representing events in an external world. Any complex, actively
mobile animal needs a way of disentangling changes to its sensory input that are due to its own
movements from changes due to events in the world [43,62–64].
A more sophisticated grade of self-consciousness involves awareness of one’s own body as a
persisting object that exists in the world [65]. This capacity is plausibly needed to pass a
mirror-mark test, in which the test subject is able to recognise a mark seen in a mirror as a
mark on its own body. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) [66], bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops
truncatus) [67], Asian elephants (Elephasmaximus) [68], andmagpies (Pica pica) [69] have report-
edly passed such a test. A striking study in 2019 reported that a fish, the cleaner wrasse
(Labroides dimidiatus), can also pass the test [70]. Fish able to view a coloured mark on their
throat in the mirror were much more likely to exhibit throat-scraping behaviour, as if to remove
a parasite, than fish who had transparent marks or no access to a mirror. These results are
controversial [71], but they suggest that the grade of self-consciousness required to pass the
mirror-mark test is possessed by a wide range of animals.
This falls short of a yet more sophisticated grade of self-consciousness, which involves awareness
of oneself as the persisting subject of a stream of experiences, distinct from other such subjects.
This is an ability related to mindreading (or theory-of-mind). It involves turning mindreading inward,
to recognise oneself as the subject of mental states. We take this to be a form of metacognition,
although the relation betweenmetacognition and mindreading is contested [72]. Humans possess
this grade and there is (debated) evidence to suggest that non-human apes [73] and corvids
[74,75] possess some mindreading ability. However, there is very little evidence of the ‘turning
inward’ of mindreading. Evidence that animals can make experience projections, inferences from
what they experience in a particular situation to what others will experience, bears on this question.
Such evidence has recently been found in great apes. In a study involving chimpanzees, bonobos
(Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo genus), only apes who had themselves experienced a
barrier as opaque were able to infer that others would not see objects on the other side of it [76].
Challenges for a Multidimensional Framework
A multidimensional approach to animal consciousness faces several key challenges. One is to
find dimensions at the right grain of analysis. If our goal were to capture all interesting variation
in conscious states, we would never have enough dimensions. We have to be pragmatic. The
five dimensions discussed previously are intended as top-level categories that can help us coor-
dinate inquiry into finer-grained variation. As noted in the sections on p-richness and e-richness,
there may well be ways of resolving our top-level dimensions into new spaces of further,
finer-grained dimensions. We welcome debate on the issue of whether our five dimensions
achieve the appropriate grain of analysis.
A second challenge is to make sure the dimensions are distinct enough from each other. What is
not required is that the dimensions should be completely uncorrelated. If one dimension is foundTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 9
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turn out that temporality is correlated with selfhood, because richer forms of temporal integration
enable a species to evolve a higher grade of self-consciousness. This is a hypothesis worthy of
further investigation. It does, however, matter that the dimensions are conceptually distinct
from each other (that they are not the same thing described in two different ways). We have
tried to ensure that our dimensions are conceptually distinct. For example, although temporality
and selfhood may be correlated, they are different concepts: it is conceivable that an animal
could have a richly temporally integrated stream of experiences without any awareness of itselfTable 1. Current Experimental Paradigms for Investigating Dimensions of Animal Consciousness.a
Dimension Experimental paradigm Question being investigated Refs
P-richness Induced blindsight Can blindsight-like phenomena be induced in the animal through lesions to specific brain regions?
If so, what information typically reaches those regions? (Drawback: highly invasive).
[19]
Discrimination learning Can the animal learn to respond differently to very slight differences between stimuli (and how small
can the differences be)?
[118]
Reversal learning When stimulus contingencies are reversed, can the animal rapidly learn that they have been
reversed? This is potentially linked to consciousness in humans.
[119,120]
Trace conditioning Can the animal still learn stimulus contingencies when the stimuli are separated by a temporal gap?
This is potentially linked to consciousness in humans.
[24,27]
E-richness Motivational trade-off Does the animal weigh different needs against each other in a ‘common currency’ to make flexible
decisions?
[30,33–35]
Outcome devaluation
and revaluation
If the value to the animal of a reward is manifestly changed, will the animal change its behaviour
quickly?
[121]
Cognitive bias Does the animal respond differently to novel stimuli depending on its affective state? [122]
Emotional contagion Is the animal susceptible to ‘catching’ the emotions of other individuals? [123]
Unity Interocular transfer If the animal is conditioned to respond to a stimulus presented in one visual hemifield, can the
same response be elicited by presenting it to the other hemifield?
[44]
Meta-control If the two visual hemifields are presented with conflicting information, can the animal resolve the conflict? [124]
Crossmodal integration Can the animal integrate information from different sense modalities (e.g., vision and hearing?) [125]
Visuo-spatial bias Does the animal exhibit visuo-spatial biases in behaviour (e.g., a preference for using a particular
eye to guide a particular task?)
[108,126]
Multitasking When given two tasks simultaneously (e.g., foraging and watching for predators), does the animal
divide the labour between the two hemispheres?
[126]
Electroencephalograph
studies of sleep
Does the animal exhibit unihemispheric or bihemispheric sleep? [45]
Temporality
(timescales b1 s)
Apparent motion Can the animal respond differently to moving and static images? Can it make inferences from video
images to real moving objects and vice versa?
[127]
Temporality
(timescales N1 s)
Episodic-like memory Can the animal simultaneously remember ‘what’, ‘where’, and ‘when’ about a specific past event? [128]
Source memory Can the animal remember information about how a memory was acquired (e.g., by vision or by smell)? [57]
Memory integration Can the animal update old memories with new information? [90]
Future planning Can the animal flexibly and spontaneously plan for a future event, and for future desires, without
relying on reinforcement learning?
[129]
Selfhood Mirror-mark Does the animal recognise a mark seen in a mirror as a mark on its own body? [66–70]
Body awareness Can the animal recognise the position of its own body as a potential obstacle to success in a task? [130]
Experience projection Can the animal predict how others are likely to behave in a scenario on the basis of a specific past
experience it had in the same scenario?
[74,76]
aA list of established experimental paradigms with the potential to provide insight into p-richness, e-richness, unity, temporality, and selfhood. There is continuing debate
regarding the implications of these paradigms for questions about conscious experience. Inferences to properties of conscious states will be stronger when based on a
battery of convergent experimental results from different paradigms. We restrict our attention here to established paradigms (see the main text for suggestions for future
work).
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Outstanding Questions
In the absence of verbal report, what
constitutes evidence that a particular
stimulus is perceived consciously
rather than unconsciously by an
animal? Can we develop tests for
conscious perception based on
cognitive abilities, such as trace
conditioning, that are linked to
conscious perception in humans?
How does the sophistication and
flexibility of affect-based decision mak-
ing vary across the animal kingdom
and how can we measure and quantify
the variation? Are there specific types
of flexible decisionmaking that indicate
conscious affect?
Can we adapt experiments designed
to probe the split-brain syndrome in
humans to explore the unity of con-
sciousness in animals? What can we
infer about the unity of consciousness
from the extensive lateralization of bird
brains? How can we test for the pres-
ence of two (or more) conscious per-
spectives in an animal?
Which animals (if any) have mechanisms
that edit incoming stimuli for coherence
and continuity, creating a flowing
stream of consciousness? Can we
find evidence in animals of illusions,
such as the colour-phi phenomenon,
that rely on this type of editing?
How can we show that animals are
consciously simulating future scenarios
and consciously reliving episodic
memories? Can we show that, in
some cases, the simulation or memory
unfolds over the same length of time
as the real, sensory experience of the
same event would?
How can we go beyond the mirror-
mark test to find evidence of higher
grades of self-consciousness? How
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesas the subject of those experiences, and it is conceivable that an animal could have temporally
fragmented ‘staccato’ experiences while being aware of itself as the subject of those fragments.
A third challenge is to find dimensions that facilitate informative comparisons between species.
We hope it will ultimately be possible to devise a standardised battery of tests that generate a
ranking of species on each dimension, but we are not there yet. That is a big challenge for the
future (see Table 1 for experimental paradigms with the potential to provide some insight). Our
aim has been to present dimensions that allow for fruitful experimental investigation, in the
hope of stimulating further discussion about how we might try to rank species along these
dimensions.
Concluding Remarks
Our five dimensions of animal consciousness vary across and within species. Instead of thinking
about variation between species in terms of levels of consciousness, we should think about
multidimensional consciousness profiles.
We are not yet in a position to construct numerical measures of all five dimensions. What we can
do is make broad, evidence-based comparisons. For example, neuroanatomical considerations
suggest that conscious experience in mammals (which have a corpus callosum) may be more
highly unified than in birds (which do not) and that experience in birds may be more highly unified
than in cephalopods. This conjecture may be overturned by more detailed evidence, but it is a
starting point. Comparisons of this type can be made along all five dimensions, allowing us to
build up consciousness profiles that tell us where a species is most likely to fit in the space of pos-
sible forms of experience, given the evidence we currently have (see Figure 1 for a conjectural
starting point, intended to illustrate the general idea of a consciousness profile). A summary of
the current evidence regarding corvids and cephalopods is given in Boxes 1 and 2.
We are still some way from being able to construct detailed, evidence-based consciousness pro-
files for a wide range of species (see Outstanding Questions). Our aim here has been to make a
case for the value of consciousness profiles in preference to the idea of a single sliding scale on
which some animals are considered more or less conscious than others.
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